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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS AT
THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL LINGERS
IN ITS CHRYSALIS STAGE
INTRODUCTION
In the past twelve years California has passed three laws in
the area of public employer-employee relations,' which have
aroused considerable controversy, outrage, and confusion between
the involved parties.2  Whereas the law regulating private em-
ployer-employee relations provides explicit provisions concerning
the interaction between parties, ambiguities and vagueness in criti-
cal areas of the law regulating the public labor makes litigation
inevitable as does the failure of these laws to provide for en-
forcement or penalties. Legal problems regarding the intent of
such laws have already arisen in practically every jurisdiction in
California.'
The most recent public employee relations law, the 1969
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act4 gives important new rights to employee
organizations, but these rights go only to those organizations for-
mally "recognized" by the public employer.5 This comment will
1. The George Brown Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1973)
(covering state employees); The Winton Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13080-88
(West 1965) (covering public school employees); The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3500-10 (West Supp. 1973).
2. Personal interview with Philip Trenholm, past President of the Western
Council of Engineers, City of Santa Clara Chapter, April 26, 1973.
3. See, e.g., San Mateo County Employee's Ass'n v. County of San Mateo,
Civil No. 142834 (San Mateo Super. Ct., Feb. 27, 1969). The San Mateo
County Superior Court issued a temporary injunction in an action brought by the
San Mateo Employees Association against the Board of Supervisors. The board
sought proposals from independent contractors to manage the food services at
San Mateo County General Hospital. The court found that the contracting pro-
cedure would affect both hours and working conditions of association members,
and therefore was a matter within sections 3504 and 3505 of the California Gov-
ernment Code (Meyers-Milias-Brown Act). In San Diego v. American Fed'n of
State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 127, Civil No. 312056 (San Diego
Super. Ct., June 9, 1969), the City of San Diego obtained a restraining order
enjoining a strike threatened by the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, (AFSCME) Local 127. The union's proposed action
was based on a complaint that the city had consistently refused to meet and
confer in good faith. The union maintained, that sections 3500-11 of the Cali-
fornia Government Code (Meyers-Milias-Brown Act) were at least neutral with
respect to the right of public employees to strike and possibly created an impli-
cation that such strikes are legal.
4. Hereinafter referred to as MMBA or the Act.
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1973).
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outline a range of problems facing public employees who seek
"recognition" for their organization in order to gain the bargain-
ing advantages provided for in the MMBA. It will then analyze
how some public jurisdictions are presently handling this issue,
and suggest possible amendments to the Act which might eliminate
"recognition" 6  and its ally "unit determination"7 as major areas
of confusion and conflict. Emphasis will be placed on arbitra-
tion as the most desirable manner to resolve disputes in the public
sector. Since the MMBA does not apply to employees of State
agencies,' only the problems of employees of subordinate govern-
mental units such as cities and counties will be considered.
HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ACTS
It is practically impossible to appreciate the magnitude of
the problems involved under the MMBA without first examining
the legislative and historical background of public employer-em-
ployee relations in California. Along the continuum of public-
employee labor relations-from complete prohibition of unionism
at one end to the private-sector model at the other--California
has progressed less than most industrial states.
Practice Prior to 1961
Before passage of the George Brown Act of 1961,1 no state
statute governed public employer-employee relations. Such is-
sues as employee organization, employee representation, and griev-
ances were dealt with in as many ways as there were state and lo-
cal public agencies. For example, the State Conciliation Service
reported in 1957 that in one local government agency there were
23 collective bargaining agreements in effect, covering approxi-
mately 5000 employees at the local government level. 10 In con-
trast, county employees in many jurisdictions complained they
had no opportunity to present their views on employee-employer
relations."'
Many associations testified to active agency hostility toward
employee organizations which attempted to represent their mem-
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3501(b) (West Supp. 1973).
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3507(a) (West Supp. 1973).
8. State employees are covered by the George Brown Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE§§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1973).
9. Cal. Stats. (1961), ch. 1964, § 1, at 41441, as amended CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 3525-36 (West Supp. 1973).
10. Ross & Schneider, The California Experiment: Meet and Confer for all
Public Employees, in CAL. Pun. EMP. REL. June 1969, at 3 (Special Issue, In-
stitute Reprint No. 334, [hereinafter cited as Ross & Schneider].
11. Id.
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bers. Employees expressed fear of reprisals for joining a bargain-
ing organization.12 In fact, some local governmental units pro-
hibited the joining of an employee organization which included
employees in other agencies and insisted that persons already
members resign.18
The George Brown Act of 1961
In 1961, the George Brown Act granted all public employ-
ees the right to join organizations of their choice and required
employing agencies to "meet and confer" with representatives of
employee organizations. The public employer, however, was only
required to consider the employee presentations, such as proposed
salary increases and fringe benefits, as fully as it deemed reason-
able before determination of policy or course of action. 4 In ef-
fect, the Act provided for little more than the right to join or not
to join employee organizations and the right of the organization
to be heard by the employer. The Act made no provision for the
resolution of impasses on any matter within the scope of repre-
sentation. Ultimately, the decision on any dispute was made uni-
laterally by the employer as had been done prior to the passage
of the Act.
Most California public employee organizations did not believe
that the 1961 legislation contributed to their effectiveness in rep-
resenting their members' interests. By the end of 1964 there
emerged a definite rejection of the "consultation" system of the
George Brown Act by some employee organizations and a shift
toward hard demands for the right to be heard on a systematic
basis. 15 Between 1964 and 1967, for example, there were strikes
in several California cities, including Antioch, Concord, Pittsburg,
and in Humbolt County; social workers struck once in Sacra-
mento County and three times on Los Angeles County.' 6
12. Personal interview with Philip Trenholm, past President of the Western
Council of Engineers, City of Santa Clara Chapter, April 26, 1973.
13. Id. The Western Council of Engineers has fought opposition from munic-
ipal management. Inhibiting tactics, employed by management to discourage
membership within the group, have taken the form of unofficial "suggestions,"
and in some instances reclassifications of personnel into "supervisory" positions,
resulting in their loss of membership eligibility.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1973).
15. Fancey, Employer-Employee Negotiations Prcedure is Outcome of Anti-
och Labor Relations Dispute, WESTEM CrrY, Aug., 1968, at 11. In 1966 a city
employee organization was dissatisfied with the existing method of presenting
salary and fringe benefit requests to the city manager of Antioch, California. The
group went on strike resulting in the attainment of a "negotiation procedure"
which entitled them to at least join in the discussions of salary and fringe bene-
fits before the city council acted on the proposed budget.
16. Ross & Schneider, supra note 10, at 7.
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The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act of 1968
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act emerged out of the unrest
among public employees in the 1960's. Passed in 1968, the Act
appears to have come as somewhat of a surprise. 7  The
MMBA's major contribution to public labor law was that it of-
fered a means for formalizing employer-employee relations in
the public sector by strengthening the right of "recognized" em-
ployee organizations to be heard and to have their views seriously
considered. The direction of the Act is to ensure that a form of
bargaining shall take place."8 That is, the public employer is put
under an obligation to endeavor to reach an agreement, although
not required to actually agree. 19
Presumably this change answered the complaint of many
employee associations that the right to meet and confer is mean-
ingless so long as the employer retains the unilateral right to act
when and how he chooses. Under the MMBA, advance notice
of changes in employee-employer relations must be given and
personal good faith communication between the employer and the
"recognized" employee organization must take place.20
The MMBA, however, like most legislation, is the child of
compromise and should be considered an interim measure. The
general intention of those who supported the Act was to provide
for some form of compulsory bargaining between employers and
employee representatives, but to do so in such a way as to accomo-
date comfortably the quite different situations which exist in Cal-
ifornia's local public jurisdictions. However, the attempt to be both
gently directive and permissive has resulted in legislation which
contains confusing and ambiguous features.
While the expanded rights embodied in the Act go only to
"recognized organizations," the Act provides no standards or
guidelines for granting recognition. Must all employee organiza-
tions be recognized? Can recognition be extended only to ma-jority representatives? To help answer these questions, the views
17. Id. at 21.
18. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505 (West Supp. 1973).
19. A similar requirement exists under federal labor legislation. Cf. Labor
Management Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1971). The key defini-
tion of collective bargaining in this federal labor legislation is:
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the rep-
resentative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment [This part of the definition is almost identical to that
contained in section 3505 of the MMBA.] or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, . . . but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the mak-
ing of a concession. Id.
20. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504.5 (West Supp. 1973).
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and characteristics of public employers, employee associations and
unions must first be examined.Any public employee relations bill which attempted to spell
out definite recognition procedures in 1968 invariably had to fail
in the state legislature. Dozens of suggested bills had been un-
successful in the past because of the impossibility of resolving
differences between unions, employee associations, and employer
groups. The MMBA succeeded in the legislature in large part be-
cause it was ambiguous on the issue of recognition procedures.
Management groups, such as the League of California Cities,
took the position that employee relations could best be handled
through local ordinances rather than general state legislation.
That organization now views the Act as permissive and in line
with its own general policy of maintaining flexibility.2
Employee associations and unions, on the other hand, gener-
ally have preferred to have a more uniform basis for determining
"recognition," but even among these groups there has been little
agreement on detail. Their inability to reach agreement is largely
due to important structural differences between independent em-
ployee associations andAFL-CIO affiliated unions. Most of the
independents are organized in only one jurisdiction and accept
all the employees of the agency. The unions, however, have
tended to concentrate on certain occupations or groups of occu-
pations and to organize across agency lines.
Moreover, independent associations and unions have dif-
ferent goals. Unions favor collective bargaining and if not the
right to strike, at least impartial settlement of disputes. The asso-
ciations concentrate on special services to their members, such
as low cost insurance, and tend to believe that collective bargaining
is inappropriate because economic gains can best be made through
rational presentations to governing bodies.
The compromise that the MMBA represents has not suc-
ceeded in pacifying these interest groups. The following section
will examine the problems arising under the Act when employers
and employees try to impose their interpretations of its ambig-
uous language upon one another.
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM
The Requirement of "Recognition"
Since the MMBA became effective on January 1, 1969,
local government agencies in California have been faced with the
necessity of deciding what rules and regulations should be adopted
21. Ross & Schneider, supra note 10, at 20.
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to determine how recognition and unit determination should be
granted. Competing associations are keenly interested in what
criteria will be established because whichever organization gains
formal recognition will concurrently acquire important new
rights.22 "Recognized" employee organizations23 and the public
agency are now mutually obligated to meet and confer in good
faith and endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope
of representation. 24
In addition, "recognized" employee organizations gain three
other advantages: (1) a reasonable number of employee repre-
sentatives must be allowed time off without loss of pay or other
benefits when formally meeting with the employer on matters
within the scope of representation; 25 (2) the employer shall give
reasonable written notice to affected organizations of proposed
changes relating to matters within the scope of representation; 26
(3) if an agreement is reached by representatives of the two
sides, the parties must jointly prepare a written memorandum of
understanding for presentation to the governing body for final
approval binding on both parties.27
Since recognition precedes the right to bargain, clearly, with-
out first becoming formally recognized by the public agency an
employee organization has little power.
Unit Determination
Unit determination, an allied issue to recognition, is also
of vital concern to all parties. For example, employee organiza-
tions seeking majority recognition will favor units which encom-
pass as many of their membership as possible; employee organi-
zations which have scattered membership may prefer large, all-
inclusive units; craft or occupation-oriented organizations may de-
sire narrowly defined units. Employers, however, do not wish to
bargain with a mass of small specialized organizations or with
22. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3503 (West Supp. 1973).
23. "A recognized employee organization means an employee organization
which has been foimally acknowledged by the public agency as an employee or-
ganization representing employees of the public agency." CAL. GOV'T CODE §3501(b) (West Supp. 1973). See J. Grodin, Public Employee Bargaining inCalifornia: The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act in the Courts, 23 HAST. L.J. 719,
732 (1972) for discussion of recognized employee organizations.24. The scope of representation includes all matters relating to employment
conditions such as pay, hours, and employer-employee relations except, that the
scope of representation shall not include consideration of the merits, necessity,
or organization of any service or activity provided by law or executive order.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3504 (West Supp. 1973).
25. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.3 (West Supp. 1973).
26. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3504.5 (West Supp. 1973).
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3505.1 (West Supp. 1973).
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two or more organizations which represent employees subject to
identical conditions of employment.
The general objectives of unit determination are to make
bargaining rights effective by defining the area within which bar-
gaining will take place and allowing the employees in the unit to
democratically select their representative. Unit determination is
not required by the MMBA, 28 nor is it prohibited. Under the
terms of California Government Code section 3507, the employer
has the unilateral right to adopt rules on recognition and, there-
fore, unit determination in order to administer the Act. Prior
to this action, however, the employer must consult in good faith
with representatives of employee organizations on their views con-
cerning appropriate units and recognition rules but the employer
need not adopt their suggestions. 29
Different Levels of Recognition: What are the Choices?
Given the fact that employee organizations in California
must be "recognized" in order to gain the expanded benefits of
the MMBA, and the fact that the employer has authority to uni-
laterally adopt rules on recognition after consultation in good
faith, how should the law on the recognition-determination issue
be interpreted? There are two possible interpretations: the em-
ployer can recognize all employee organizations or he can estab-
lish a differential recognition system. Either system can be sup-
ported by reference to various sections of the MMBA.
Case 1: All Employee Organizations Must Be Recognized
Section 3501(a) defines an employee organization as one
which includes employees of the public agency, with one of
its prime purposes being the representation of its members in
their relations with that agency. Within the same section a
narrower definition describes employee groups which have been
formally acknowledged by the public agency as representing
employees of the governmental subdivision. These groups are
identified as being "recognized employee organizations". Once
28. Cf. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 9(a), (b) & (c)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 159(a), (b) & (c)(5) (1971). In contrast to the MMBA, under the
NLRA careful rules govern unit determination. Appropriate units for bargain-
ing are determined on the basis of custom, and in some cases by consent to
union claims. Where a voluntary agreement regarding the appropriate bargain-
ing unit cannot be reached, hearings are held by the regional director of the
NLRB; his determination is subject to limited review by the Board. In establish-
ing the bargaining unit, the Board has a wide variety of choices; employees in
a single plant might be grouped as a unit or divided according to craft or depart-
ment, or placed in larger classifications.
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507 (West Supp. 1973).
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"recognized," section 3503 provides, through mandatory lan-
guage, that these organizations have the right to represent their
members in employment relations with the public agency. Sec-
tions 3502 and 3506 give public employees the right to join
organizations of their choosing for the purpose of being rep-
resented on matters pertaining to employer-employee relations,
and the employers are prohibited from interfering with this right.
In view of these sections, the argument is posited that if all
employees have a right to join organizations "for the purpose
of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations"
without interference from the employer while only "recognized"
employee organizations have the right to so represent their mem-
bers, then clearly all employee organizations must be "recog-
nized."8  Subsequent to passage of the MMBA, this view was
expressed in an opinion by the legislative counsel, in which he
stated that the only reason a public agency could refuse to for-
mally acknowledge an organization as a "recognized employee
organization" is that the organization failed to meet the criteria
set forth in section 3501(a) of the Act. He further stated that
a refusal on any other basis would impair the rights of public
employees to form, join and participate in the activities of em-
ployee organizations of their own choice and would therefore be
clearly contrary to the purposes of the Act."
Some local jurisdictions have adopted rules which allow rec-
ognition for all employee organizations. Among these are the
Valley Central Municipal Water District, Tulare County, and the
cities of Downey and Manhattan Beach.32  There are some ob-
vious shortcomings to such an approach. The general recognition
policy might encourage vigorous competition to recruit and retain
members and is likely to lead to exaggerated demands on the em-
ployer who under the MMBA is committed to deal with organiza-
tions he has "recognized" regardless of how unrepresentative
they may be or how time consuming the process becomes. 8
Case 2: Differential Recognition
A second interpretation, which is supported by the League
of California Cities, holds that "recognition" may be granted
30. Schneider, Unit Determination: Experiments in California Local Gov-
ernment, 3 CAL. PuB. EMP. REL. 8 (Nov., 1969) [hereinafter cited as Schneider].
31. Assembly Daily Journal 7081-82 (Aug. 2, 1968).
32. Downey, Calif., Ordinance 356, Dec. 23, 1968; Manhattan Beach, Calif.,
Ordinance 1154, Dec. 3, 1968; Tulare County, Calif., Resolution 68-2459, as
amended Feb. 18, 1969; Valley Center Municipal Water District, Calif., Employ-
ees' Rules and Regulations, Mar. 17, 1969.
33. Schneider, supra note 30, at 9.
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only to organizations with majority support, so long as mi-
nority groups may make presentations to the employer and
have such presentations taken into consideration. The majority
organization would be recognized; the minority organization would
only be given informal recognition."' Support for this interpreta-
tion is derived from several sections of the MMBA.
A primary purpose of the Act, as indicated in sections 3500
and 3505, is to provide a "reasonable" method of resolving dis-
putes. Arguably, this requirement could not be met in situations
where competing employee organizations are given equal recogni-
tion or where many organizations represent only a small percent-
age of employees with common employment conditions.
The employer is allowed to adopt reasonable rules on recog-
nition through section 3507 of the Act. This clause leaves open
the possibility of various systems of recognition which may be
utilized by the public agency. An argument could be advanced
that if the legislature intended all organizations to be recognized
it would not have allowed this latitude for variation. The pro-
ponents of this position believe that general recognition will lead
to chaos. They assert that through recognition procedures man-
agement can determine that only one union may represent a cer-
tain class of employees with an identifiable common interest re-
gardless of department. For example, they maintain that each
laborer has a common interest in salary terms with all other la-
borers, regardless of the department in which he works. The
same is true of clerks, stenographers, and even truck drivers-all
of whom are found in many different departments of local gov-
ernment.8 5
Management is attempting to avoid the situation where an
employee organization signs as members a majority of the em-
ployees of one department but only a minority of the public
agency's total employment of a given class of employees. Under
a general recognition system, that organization would then repre-
sent the minority group in salary negotiations despite the fact
that the salary schedule covers all employees of that class in all
departments. Management's proposed resolution of the problem
is to recognize such an organization on an informal basis only.
The organization could then present pay demands to the em-
ployer and represent its member in grievances, but would have to
accept decisions negotiated by the majority organization with re-
gard to department-wide working conditions.
The problems presented by the differential recognition system
34. League of California Cities, Suggested Draft Ordinance, Jan. 30, 1969.
35. 1 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS NEWSLETTER, No. 6 (Nov., 1970).
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are exemplified by the experiences of a typical employee organ-
ization attempting to gain recognition. The Western Council
of Engineers (WCE) seeks to represent civil engineers work-
ing for public agencies in the San Francisco Bay Area.86  Under
section 3507.3,87 professional employees such as engineers cannot
be denied the right to separate representation from non-profes-
sionals. Therefore, professionals as a class are defined by law as
an appropriate employee unit.8 8 Disputes over the application of
the language of section 3507.3 have given rise to considerable
litigation.89 Moreover, the WCE would prefer to represent an
even smaller unit comprised only of public works engineers. To
gain recognition, however, they have had to conform to a morass
of different criteria which vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
The City of Santa Clara, California requires an employee
organization to represent at least five percent of the total number
of full time employees before granting recognition to that organ-
ization.4 ° Since there are approximately five hundred employees
working for the city, of which only fifteen are engineers, the WCE
may not gain recognition despite the fact that one hundred per-
cent of the engineers desire this organization to represent them.
To be "recognized," the WCE must find ten other professionals,
such as architects, accountants, or city attorneys, who would allow
an engineer's employee organization to represent them.
On January 17, 1972, the Superior Court of the County of
Santa Clara ordered the City of Santa Clara to amend its Employ-
36. Western Council of Engineers, Articles of Incorporation, Art. IV & V
(Aug., 1970).
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3507.3 (West Supp. 1973).
38. Id.
39. In Alameda County Assistant Public Defenders Ass'n v. County of Ala-
meda, 33 Cal. App. 3d 825, 109 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1973), the county denied recog-
nition to the public defender's association and created a bargaining unit group-
ing public defenders with auditors, planners, and rodent and weed inspectors.
The appellate court found a violation of Government Code section 3507, provid-
ing that no public agency shall unreasonably withhold recognition of employee
organizations. In Los Angeles County Firefighters Local 1014, AFL-CIO v.
City of Monrovia, 24 Cal. App. 3d 289, 101 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1972), the court
directed the city to recognize a union seeking to represent fire department em-
ployees and to bargain in good faith with the union. In Western Council of
Eng'rs v. County of Santa Clara, Civil No. 249039 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., Apr.
27, 1971), the court held that engineers were entitled to representation in a unit
separate from nonprofessional employees. But see California Licensed Voca-
tional Nurses, Inc. v. Sequoia Hosp. Dist., Civil No. 141277 (San Mateo Super.
Ct., June 4, 1971) and Licensed Vocational Nurses League of Calif., Inc. v.
County of Sacramento, Civil No. 207379 (Sacramento Super. Ct., Nov. 25,
1970), in which licensed vocational nurses were denied judicial recognition as
"professionals" as defined in the MMBA.
40. City of Santa Clara, Calif., RESOLUTION No. 2428 AND 2428-A, § Ila Em-
ployer-Employee Relations and Implementing Rules and Regulations, Oct. 28,
1971.
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er-Employee Relations Rules and Regulations to eliminate dis-
criminatory effects upon professional employees who seek to be
represented separately from other employees within the city. 41
The County of San Mateo, on the other hand, has what
amounts to a general recognition system. In its proposed draft
of an ordinance covering employer-employee relations, the only
requirement for "recognition" is that the organization include
employees of the county who had designated the organization to
represent them. In contrast to the percentage requirement im-
posed by the City of Santa Clara, the County of San Mateo has
formally recognized the WCE although it represents far less than
five percent of the county's total employees.
In Sacramento County the principal criterion for recogni-
tion and unit determination is a finding of a community of in-
terest among the employees comprising the proposed unit.42 The
City of Berkeley's resolution requires that the Personnel Board
designate the representation unit. The Board is required to con-
sider but is not bound by such factors as internal and occupa-
tional community of interest, history of representation, and the ef-
fect of the representation unit on the efficient operation of the
city.48
Reliance upon the "community of interest" doctrine as the
principle unit determination criterion in Sacramento County un-
fortunately does not resolve the conflict. For example, the WCE
argues that public works engineers are an appropriate unit, with
a community of interests, based upon the existence of a single pro-
fession with common interests and goals. The State Legislative
Counsel has taken a similar position and stated that separate
representation of each profession was intended by the MMBA.
The representation of professional enployees against their wishes
by arn employee organization composed of a variety of profes-
sional employees is contrary to the declared intention of the Act
to permit employees to choose their own representative."
The city management of Oakland and Berkeley have inter-
preted section 3507.3 literally and argue that although the sec-
tion grants professionals the right to be represented separately
from nonprofessionals, it is silent as to whether professional em-
41. Western Council of Eng'rs v. City of Santa Clara, Civil No. 255387
(Santa Clara Super. Ct., Jan. 17, 1972).
42. County of Sacramento, Calif., AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE SACRAMENTO
COUNTY CODE RELATING TO EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (July 26, 1970).
43. City of Berkeley, Calif., RESOLUTION No. 43,397, N.S., § 5 (Oct. 14,
1969),.
44. 1 Assembly Daily Journal, Reg. Sess., Appendix at 9-10 (1970).
1974]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
ployees in each profession must be represented separately.45 Thus
they insist upon large units in an attempt to maintain efficiency
and avoid competition among small special interest units over
such items as salaries.
In Alameda County, the Board of Supervisors established
a county wide unit consisting of approximately 360 non-health-
related professional employees. Organizations representing en-
gineers and public defenders claimed the unit violated section
3507.3. In a court action4 it was held that "under the provision
of Government Code section 3507.3 attorneys and engineers have
a right to be represented separately from non-professional em-
ployees, but they do not have a right to be represented separately
from other professional employees. '4 7
Resolving the Problem of Unit Determination
As the experiences of the WCE demonstrate, problems arise
from "fair" application of "reasonable" criteria. Management rea-
sonably seeks to avoid proliferation and institutionalization of
union competition over wages and working conditions. Employ-
ees and their organizations logically refuse to abandon those cri-
teria which encourage self-determination in favor of the employ-
er's emphasis upon the need for efficiency of government opera-
tions. Where employers and employee representatives have been
unable to compromise their differences over criteria for recogni-
tion and unit determination, the common resolution in California
has been for the employer to make the final decision.
Section 3507.1, a 1971 addition to the MMBA, provides
limited improvement in this situation:
In the absence of local procedures for resolving disputes on
the appropriateness of a unit of representation, upon the re-
quest of any of the parties, the dispute shall be submitted to
the Department of Conciliation of the Department of Indus-
trial Relations for mediation or for recommendation for the
resolving of the dispute. 48
The key phrase which brings this section into operation, if elected
by one of the parties, is "in the absence of local procedures."
It does not require that local procedures conform to any par-
ticular standards of neutrality nor does it provide for any review
45. City of Berkeley, Calif., RESOLUTON No. 43,397, N.S., § 6 (Oct. 14,
1969).
46. Alameda County Ass't Public Defenders Ass'n v. County of Alameda, Civil
No. 412309 (Alameda Super. Ct., May 21, 1971).
47. Id.
48. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3507.1 (West Supp. 1973).
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of a determination reached through local procedures. An example
of neutral procedures for unit determination exists in the system
adopted by the County of Sacramento, where the determination
is made by a neutral arbitrator.49
The MMBA provides no sanctions for noncompliance with
the provisions of the Act and no means of enforcement This
does not mean that recourse cannot be had for a refusal to con-
form to the requirements of the Act. A group of employees who
believe that they are being damaged or will be damaged by non-
conformance with the Act may file suit in a superior court for in-
junctive and/or declaratory relief. The WCE, for example, filed
suit against the City of Santa Clara ° for "recognition" and is
considering filing a similar complaint against the City of Berke-
ley.
Generally speaking, an injunction is an effective way to bring
a reluctant party into a meet-and-confer situation However,
for the embryonic employee organization, trying to build mem-
bership and establish itself, costly litigation can have a definite
chilling effect on its growth. As the suits are appealed, the
membership becomes more and more reluctant to dip into their
pockets. Interest quickly wanes and enrollment drops. It is
thus important to analyze the alternatives to resolving recogni-
tional impasses in the courts and to consider the factors which
should be studied before trying to amend the MMBA.
The Right to Strike
One means of resolving an impasse in employer-employee
relations in the public sector would be to use the ultimate wea-
pon of the private sector, the strike. In almost every state, how-
ever, public employees do not have the legally protected right
to strike. Although California law does not expressly prohibit
striking by public employees (except with regard to policemen
and firemen), the courts of this state have interpreted legisla-
tive silence as denying this right. In Almond v. County of Sac-
ramento5' the court stated that "[i]n the absence of legislative
authorization public employees in general do not have the right to
strike . . . ,,52 That case reaffirmed the earlier view expressed
49. Arbitrator Morris Myers decided which units would qualify for recogni-
tion 10 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL., Aug., 1971, at 9.
50. Western Council of Eng'rs v. City of Santa Clara, Civil No. 255387
(Santa Clara Super. Ct., Jan. 17, 1972).
51. 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969).
52. Id. at 35, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 520, quoting Los Angeles Met. Transit Author-
ity v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d 684, 687, 355 P.2d 905, 906,
8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1960).
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in Newmarker v. Regents of the University of California" in
which the court held that,
as public employees they do not have the same rights to
strike and to bargain collectively as their counterparts in
private industry, [and if they were unhappy about it] plain-
tiff's remedy lies with the Legislature, not with the courts. 54
Any right to strike by public employees must therefore de-
pend upon a statutory change to expressly grant that right. This
author, among others,55 believes that a comparison of public and
private sector employment relations demonstrates that a statutory
change to permit public employee strikes is not an appropriate
means of resolving the public employment impasse.
In the private sector there are significant restraints on union
power. For example, wage increases which exceed rises in pro-
ductivity usually result in higher prices. A price increase for one
product relative to others will generally cause a decrease in the
number of units of that product sold as consumers adjust their
preferences to changed price relationships. Reduced demand may
then result in lay-offs.
In the public sector, on the other hand, the products and
services of the government generally do not have close substitutes
and are not subject to competition. A reduction of services
caused by wage increases will be resisted not only by the employee
organization but also by the beneficiaries of those services-the
local voters. The public employee strike thus becomes a power-
ful political weapon. Government officials are pressured from
two sides. The voters, inconvenienced by the interruption of ser-
vices, call upon their elected officials to press for a settlement,
and, at the same time, resist any increase in taxes to provide ad-
ditional funds. If the government tries to redistribute its fi-
nances, other employee organizations will strongly contest any
cutbacks or layoffs that affect their members. 56
Clearly, public employee organizations will have a dispro-
portionate share of political power if the strike becomes the
normal method for breaking impasses. Bargaining would be-
come only a formality. Public employee strikes rely heavily for
their success on voter inconvenience caused by cessation of vital
services. But the relatively modest effect of a strike by librar-
53. 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 325 P.2d 558 (1958).
54. id. at 646, 325 P.2d at 564.
55. See, e.g., AARON, FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 184-92 (1973); H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER,
THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES (1972).
56. Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employ-
ment, 79 YALE L.J. 805, 822-23 (1969-70).
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ians, accountants, planners and other white collar workers cannot
compare with the impact of a strike, in terms of public discom-
fort and safety, by policemen, firemen, or maintenance forces.
The immediate effect on the public as a whole of a strike by munic-
ipal planners or engineers, for example, is not dramatic. If
required the public agency can easily contract out the pub-
lic work to private counterparts of the striking groups. The su-
perior bargaining position is then left with those striking groups
whose actions produce an immediate effect on the public, and are
not easily replaceable by private organizations capable of provid-
ing the same service. Thus with increasing strikes, the disparity
in political power would enlarge until employee organizations,
whose effect on the public is minimal, will subsidize stronger
groups as the public agency is forced to accede to the latter's de-
mands for greater benefits, thereby reducing the available munici-
pal funds for remaining employee organizations. 57
Arbitration
The relative merits of public employee strikes have been
fully discussed elsewhere, 8 however, a far more satisfactory means
of resolving impasses in the public sector can be found in an
alternative to the strike: arbitration.
Two arguments have been advanced against arbitration:
first, public employers argue that arbitration of public employment
disputes could constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive and executive authority; second, they argue arbitration will
destroy free collective bargaining and the willingness of the parties
to resolve their own disputes. Through arbitration, a third
party who might not understand the peculiar intricacies of local
affairs and who would have no continuing responsibility for the
results would have binding power to resolve disputes and thus
significantly influence the operation of local government.
Several court decisions59 have construed laws which pro-
vide for public employment arbitration and have met the issue of un-
constitutional delegation of power. The Wyoming Supreme Court
held a compulsory arbitration statute for firemen valid rejecting
57. H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 17-32
(1972).
58. Ross, Public Employee Unions and the Right to Strike, 92 MONTHLY
LAB. REV., March, 1969, at 3-14; Witt, The Public Sector Strike: Dilemma of
the Seventies, 8 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 102 (1971); When Cities Collide With the
Unions, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 2, 1971, at 29-30.
59. Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Penn. 1969); City of Warwick v. War-
wick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206 (R.I. 1969); Wyoming v. City of
Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
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the argument that it was an unconstitutional delegation of power
expressly reserved to the state legislature. The court found that
the statute conferred on the arbitrators the power to execute
but not to make the law.60
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has upheld the constitution-
ality of a compulsory arbitration statute for police and firemen.
The court relied on a recent amendment to the Pennsylvania
State Constitution expressly authorizing compulsory arbitration
and found the legislative purpose to be the protection of the public
from strikes by policemen and firemen.6' Finally, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court found no "delegation of power" because
arbitrators were public officers or agents of the legislature when
they were carrying out their arbitration duties pursuant to the stat-
ute.6
2
Undoubtedly, these three state supreme court decisions will
not be the final word on the subject. However, they do indicate
that while legal questions are important, courts may not consider
them paramount to the question of whether arbitration can work
effectively to resolve public employee disputes.
A more serious problem area is the threat that arbitration
will destroy bargaining in the public sector. Experiences in
other states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and Rhode
Island have provided some evidence that there can be effective
bargaining without the protected right to strike.63 Furthermore,
arbitration procedures can be established which will actually
stimulate bargaining.6 4  In practical terms, as administrators of
arbitration statutes become more experienced they learn to de-
cline or defer the submission of disputes to arbitration until ser-
ious efforts at negotiation have been tried.6 5
60. Wyoming v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
61. Harney v. Russo, 255 A.2d 560 (Penn. 1969).
62. City of Warwick v. Warwick Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 256 A.2d 206
(R.I. 1969).
63. All three states have statutes providing for public employment arbitra-
tion. MiH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 600.5001 (Supp. 1973); PA. ANN. STAT. tit.
43, §§ 217.1 to 217.10 (Supp. 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. tit. 28, §§ 28-9.1
to 28-9.4 (1968). Several successful arbitrations have been concluded under the
Rhode Island procedure, and in 1969, over sixty arbitration cases were adminis-
tered in Pennsylvania for police and firemen. Anderson, Compulsory Arbitra-
tion Under State Statutes, 22 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 259, 275 (1970).
64. See, e.g., AARON, FINAL REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL
ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 187 (1973).
65. To ease the hypothesized "chilling effect" of arbitration on collective
bargaining, the arbitrator's power could be confined to either accepting the pro-
posal of one or the other party. This would place a greater burden on the par-
ties to bargain in good faith and to reach a mutual agreement. See, note 50
supra.
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Scope of Arbitration
The effectiveness of arbitration as a means of settling other
types of disputes in the public sector indicates its potential for
resolving issues of recognition and unit determination under the
MMBA. As discussed above, the resolution of the unit determina-
tion issue should not be left solely to the administrative discretion
of each public agency in the state. Instead, an impartial ad-
ministering organization should be created and invested with
sufficient authority to develop detailed standards for final unit
determinations within statutory guidelines. This recommenda-
tion goes beyond the proposal made by the State Personnel Board
before the Assembly Committee on Public Employment in Oc-
tober, 1969,6 that recognition and unit determination issues be
resolved by an independent board. It is the contention of this
author that the board's determination must be made binding upon
the parties in order to be effective. A board with such power
would provide a means of peacefully resolving disputes in the
public sector without resorting to costly litigation.
A further question which must be confronted is who should
establish this independent board: should each public agency set
up its own board, or should it go through the process of selecting
arbitrators for each new impasse? Procedures will vary from jur-
isdiction to jurisdiction making it difficult for unions organizing
across agency lines to conform to different requirements. Also,
if a local arbitration board is established on a permanent basis,
there may be a danger of partiality toward either the employer or
the union. On the other hand, if the agency requires a new set of
arbitrators to be chosen for each new impasse in order to eliminate
the possibility of prejudice, precious time will be wasted, result-
ing in inefficency.
A far better solution is the establishment of an independent
body that is not directly affiliated with an particular local govern-
ment. Such a body offers the greatest flexibility and impartiality
in resolving controversial unit determination problems as well as
other "meet-and-confer" issues, such as grievances, scope of repre-
sentation, and recognition. The obvious choice is a state level
agency which is empowered by the legislature to perform a dual
function: first, to enforce the provisions of the state statute and
to implement impasse procedures; second, to take on functions
delegated to it by local regulation. The state statutory provision
would provide minimum standards which would be aimed at en-
couraging local initiative, but, at the same time, would guard
against local inaction by establishing concurrent power. Thus,
66. CALIF. ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATION 23
(1969).
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if a municipality desired to adopt different impasse procedures
than those provided in the state statute, this agency could ad-
minister them. The value of such a state agency would stem
from the experience and specialized skills it would develop, plus its
neutral position with regard to local employer-employee disputes.
A state level agency would also minimize the effect of the
intrusion by a third party into employer-employee bargaining. A
common argument against submitting disagreements to outside
arbitration is that the arbitrators will not be sensitive to such
local government issues as fiscal structures, budgetary practices
and strict limitation on taxes. But, subordinate government units
such as towns, counties, and cities derive their power from the
state. Many of the limitations which constrain their bargaining
with employee associations are the result of restrictions imposed
by the state. Therefore, state officals are likely to be more
sensitive to local problems than other independent arbitrators.
Another advantage to placing arbitration powers exclusively
in a state agency is that the problem of unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority is easily met. If the legislature estab-
lishes recognition guidelines, and in turn creates an agency to
administer the law, the courts would have difficulty in holding
that powers reserved to the governing bodies are unlawfully placed
in the hands of persons not responsible to the electorate.
Finally, although the independent agency would initially
consider non-fiscal problems such as recognition and unit deter-
mination, inevitably it would be compelled to consider monetary
issues. The resulting arbitration decisions could be made binding
for non-fiscal matters and advisory for fiscal issues, thus avoid-
ing legal problems which might force local governments into debt
thus requiring additional taxes. This method has been success-
fully employed in Maine where a statute covering municipal em-
ployees provides for binding arbitration of enumerated issues but
for advisory arbitration on fiscal matters.6 7
Advisory arbitration is advisory in the sense that the legisla-
tive body of the particular local governmental unit has the final
authority to approve or disapprove the contract terms. For ex-
ample, in Connecticut bargaining is usually between the ex-
ecutive and employee representatives, but the legislative body
must approve any negotiated agreement between these parties
which results in budgetary consequences. The agreement, how-
ever, takes effect if the legislative body fails to modify the recom-
mendations within a specified time period.6 8
67. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 961-72 (Supp. 1973).
68. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(b) (Supp. 1969).
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To date, only one jurisdiction in California has made use of
the experiences of other states. The City of Vallejo has become
the first public entity69 (other than transit districts) to include
compulsory and binding arbitration as the final step in a dispute
settlement procedure.7" On April 1, 1972, the first arbitration
award settling a negotiation's dispute in California local govern-
ment was handed down by a three-man board of arbitrators as
provided by the Vallejo City Charter.71 Under the revised char-
ter, impasses between the city and any of its recognized employee
organizations are first subject to mediation, then fact finding with
public recommendations, and finally compulsory binding arbitra-
tion. 72  There is as yet no case law in California regarding the
legality of this new provision. However, because this provision
was approved by the voters, the argument that this is an unlawful
delegation of public sovereignty would be difficult to raise.
CONCLUSION
The MMBA is at best an interim measure for it provides no
appropriate machinery to resolve recognition, unit determination,
and representation disputes arising out of employer-employee
impasses. Neither does it ensure adherence by all parties to the
law, nor provide the means for facilitating resolution of contro-
versies. New legislation is necessary to authorize voluntary and
binding arbitration of contract terms and to establish standards
and criteria for arbitration which would overcome the objections
of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and the ab-
sence of arbitration standards.
The state should continue to prohibit public employee strikes
but counter the effects of this restriction by establishing manda-
tory recognition and impasse resolution procedures. For example,
local governments might permit different collective bargaining
procedures, redefine mandatory subjects of bargaining and estab-
lish procedures for resolution of nonmonetary issues. The state
statute would merely set the minimum standards. Such a statu-
tory scheme providing for concurrent power would both en-
courage local initiative and, at the same time, guard against local
inertia.
69. See, e.g., CALIF. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 25051 (West 1973) (Alameda &
Contra Costa Counties); § 70120 (West 1973) (Main); § 28850 (West 1973)
(San Francisco bay area).
70. Compulsory Arbitration in Vallejo: An Experiment in Dispute Settle-
ment, 13 CAL. PUB. EMP. REL., June, 1972, at 21.
71. Id. City of Vallejo, Calif., VALLEJo CITY CHARTER §H 809-10, as
amended, (June 1970).
72. Compulsory Arbitration in Vallejo: An Experiment in Dispute Settle-
ment, 13 CAL. PuB. EMP. RL., June, 1972, at 21.
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Finally, the legislature should provide for a state arbitra-
tion agency which would enforce the law uniformly throughout
California and assure that any additional local procedures are
within the scope and intent of the Act. In spite of the emotional,
legal, and practical objections to arbitration, there is evidence
from other states that a system of binding arbitration for non-
fiscal issues is gaining acceptance in the public sector. In Ca-
lifornia, it is clear that if steps are not taken soon to strengthen
the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, litigation will inevitably increase
as public employees press harder to be represented by organiza-
tions of their own choice, and public employers continue to insist
on maintaining efficiency by limiting that choice.
Robert W. Stroup
